In the present paper we explicate the probabilistic approach, in as far as we found it telling and conducive. The approach is by no means new. It dates back at least to Straffin (1978 Straffin ( , 1988 , and the Felsenthal and Machover (1998) monograph makes excellent use of it. Nevertheless we believe that a 're-view' on its role may prove useful.
In their final Chap. 8, Felsenthal and Machover (1998) make a point to take abstentions seriously. We maintain that ternary voting profiles provide a sufficiently general reference set supporting both, ternary decision rules that permit abstentions, and binary decision rules that are restricted to Yea-Nay voting (Sect. 2). The ensuing development depends on the probability distribution adopted. A model is truly ternary when it assigns positive weights to voting profiles with at least one abstention. The case of abstention probability zero leads back to the binary setting. The Penrose/Banzhaf models (Sect. 3) and the Shapley/Shubik models (Sect. 4) come with abstention probabilities t 2 OE0; 1/ that afford a smooth transition between ternary and binary settings. We conclude with an outlook on bloc decision rules, a prime example being provided by the Council of Ministers of the European Union (Sect. 5).
Ternary Voting Profiles
Let N denote an assembly consisting of finitely many agents j . When a proposal is tabled and a vote is taken, the results are recorded as a vector a D .a j / j 2N , a voting profile. The vote of agent j is reported as a j D yea when j votes Yea, a j D nay when j votes Nay, or a j D abstain when j abstains. The natural ordering among these values is nay Ä abstain Ä yea. Felsenthal and Machover (1998, p. 282) use the coding nay D 1, abstain D 0, and yea D 1.
The ensemble of all voting profiles constitutes the ternary profile space N D n .a j / j 2Nˇaj 2 fnay; abstain; yeag; for all j 2 N o :
Every profile a 2 N induces a region of growing acceptance consisting of those profiles b that express at least as much acceptance as is reported in a,
A subset W N Â N is called a decision rule when it satisfies the three properties OEa; yea Â W N ; for all a 2 W N ;
.yea; : : : ; yea/ 2 W N ;
.abstain; : : : ; abstain/ 6 2 W N :
The profiles a that constitute the subset W N are called winning, in the sense that a proposal is carried if and only if a belongs to W N . We do not consider systems in which the final outcome might be a tie. Therefore the complement W C N D N n W N comprises the profiles that are loosing. Thus a subset W N is a decision rule if and only if (1) it is acceptance-monotonic: if a is winning and b reports at least as much acceptance as does a, then b is also winning, (2) unanimous acceptance is winning, and (3) unanimous abstention is loosing. Now we fix some decision rule W N , and investigate its merits from the point of view of agent j . Two events transpire to be of particular interest. First, there is the set A j .W N / of agreeable profiles, when j agrees with the final outcome. Second, there is the set C j .W N / of critical profiles, when the vote of j is decisive to turn the profile winning or loosing. Let the notation .a i / i ¤j & .yea/ j represent the profile where the votes of the other agents i ¤ j are concatenated with a Yea from agent j . Similarly .a i / i ¤j & .nay/ j is to indicate that the votes of the others is completed with j 's Nay. The two events mentioned may then be described as follows:
So far the exposition is descriptive and qualitative. It is only now that we consider quantitative indices. All of them originate from a probability measure P given on the ternary profile space N , with some of them being peculiar to an agent j :
P OEW N the efficiency of the decision rule W N ; P A j .W N / the success probability of agent j; P C j .W N / the influence probability of agent j; P C j .W N / = † P .W N / the power share of agent j; utilizing
The indices coincide with those in the monograph (Felsenthal and Machover 1998) , except that in The Book they are related to specific distributions, namely the Penrose/Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik distributions in their variants with abstention probability equal to zero (see below). In particular, our notion of Penrose/Banzhaf influence probability of agent j is the same as their Banzhaf power (or absolute Banzhaf index) of j , and our power share of agent j coincides with their Banzhaf index of voting power (or relative Banzhaf index) of j . Our motivation for not specializing the probabilistic assumptions too early is that there are results like Theorem 1 below which hold quite generally. To this end we need to introduce some notation. The dual profile dual.a/ of a ternary voting profile a 2 N is defined by reversing the votes of all agents j 2 N ,
A distribution P is said to be selfdual when a voting profile and its dual are assigned identical probabilities, P OEfag D P fdual.a/g . A distribution P is said to be exchangeable when it remains invariant under all permutations of the assembly N . In the presence of exchangeability, a maximal invariant statistic tallies the yeas, nays, and abstentions of a voting profile a 2 N into the three counts Yea.a/, Nay.a/, and Abst.a/, respectively.
The success margin .W N /.a/ is defined to be the difference between the number of those who vote in favor of the final outcome, and those who vote against it,
Yea.a/ Nay.a/ in case a 2 W N ;
Nay.a/ Yea.a/ in case a 2 W C N :
Two decision rules deserve special attention. The first is the unanimity rule U N , signaling acceptance when nobody is objecting, and the second is the straight majority rule M N , requiring the Yeas to outnumber the Nays,
Theorem 1. Let the ternary profile space N be equipped with be a selfdual and exchangeable probability distribution P . Then every decision rule W N has its expected success margin lying between the expected success margins of the unanimity rule and of the straight majority rule,
Proof. See Proposition 4.1 in Birkmeier et al. (2011) . u t
The unanimity rule and the straight majority rule are two instances of the wider class of weighted decision rules W N OEqI .w j / j 2N . Such a rule is determined by a quota q 2 OE0; 1/, and voting weights w j > 0 for agents j 2 N . For a given voting profile a let YCW.a/ D P j 2N Wa j Dyea w j designate the Yea-voters' cumulative weight, and NCW.a/ D P j 2N Wa j Dnay w j the Nay-voters' cumulative weight. A ternary voting profile a is defined to be winning, a 2 W N OEqI .w j / j 2N , when the Yea-voters' cumulative weight exceeds the fraction q of the cumulative weight of all non-abstainers, YCW.a/ > q YCW.a/ C NCW.a/ .
The Penrose/Banzhaf Model
The Penrose/Banzhaf distribution P t N assumes that all agents act independently, abstain with a common abstention probability t 2 OE0; 1/, and divide the remaining likelihood 1 t equally between a Yea and a Nay. In this model, a ternary voting profile a 2 N carries the probability (i) For all agents j 2 N , success and influence probabilities are related through
(ii) The influence sensitivity and the expected success margin of
Proof. See Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 in Birkmeier et al. (2011) . u t
With t D 0, this coincides with the results in Theorems 3.2.16 and 3.3.5 in Felsenthal and Machover (1998) , see also Ruff and Pukelsheim (2010) . Birkmeier (2011, Satz 2.3.4) presents a version of part (i) dealing with a slightly larger set of profiles that are considered a success for agent j , namely those that are agreeable to agent j combined with those wherein j abstains (and which might be considered "weakly agreeable").
The Shapley/Shubik Model
The Shapley/Shubik distribution S t N on N is built up in three stages. The first stage, dealing with abstentions, is new. We propose to assume all agents to abstain independently, with a common abstention probability t 2 OE0; 1/. Under this assumption the number`of those who abstain follows a binomial distribution, nŠ Š.n `/Š t`.1 t/ n `. The second and third stages are standard. The number of Yea-voters k is taken to attain each of its possible values 0; : : : ; n `with the same probability, 1= n `C 1 . Third, each of the nŠ kŠ`Š.n k `/Š profiles with k Yeas,`abstentions, and n k `Nays is considered equally likely. Thus, with some of the factorial terms canceling out and after re-substituting Yea.a/ for k and Yea.a/ C Nay.a/ for n `, the total probability of a ternary voting profile a 2 N becomes
In binary models, it is well-known that every decision rule W N has Shapley/Shubik influence sensitivity equal to unity. This entails two intriguing consequences, that the Shapley/Shubik sensitivity is insensitive to the specific decision rule W N , and that the Shapley/Shubik influence probability of an agent j coincides with her or his power share. In ternary Shapley/Shubik models, the first conclusion persists, the second does not. Proof. See Satz 2.3.9 in Birkmeier (2011) . u t
The right hand side is the same as 1 C t C C t n 1 . Hence its limit equals n, the number of agents, as the abstention probability t tends to unity. This is quite plausible since, with the likelihood of abstention growing, each of the n agents is getting to be more and more critical when casting a clear Yea-or Nay-vote, and in the end acquires an influence probability equal to unity.
The EU Council of Ministers
In some applications the grand assembly N is partitioned into disjoint subsets, called blocs. The associated two-tier voting system is composed of internal decision rules within blocs, and a second-level decision rule among bloc delegates. An example is the Council of Ministers of the European Union, where the entirety of the Union citizens, N , is partitioned into the 27 blocs of its Member States' citizenries that are represented by their Ministers.
In the binary Penrose/Banzhaf bloc model, the influence probability of citizen j 2 N in a two-tier system typically factorizes into the product of the internal influence probability of j in her or his bloc B, times the second-level influence probability of bloc B relative to the specified bloc partitioning, see Straffin (1978) , Felsenthal and Machover (2002) , Laruelle and Valenciano (2004) , or Ruff and Pukelsheim (2010) . These product formulas generalize to carry over to ternary Penrose/Banzhaf bloc models, see Birkmeier (2011) for a bottom up construction (Satz 5.1.3) as well as for a top down construction (Satz 5.1.6).
The analysis may be employed to design optimal decision rules that permit abstentions. The underlying notion of optimality builds on a weighted average of the diplomatic one state, one vote principle that underlies international relations among Member States, and of the democratic one person, one vote principle that would apply to the Union citizens, see Widgrén (1998) and Satz 5.3.3 in Birkmeier (2011) . However, it is by no means evident whether the Treaty of Lisbon (2010) would support the two equality principles and, if so, whether they may be mixed into a single optimality criterion.
Nevertheless, a statistical evaluation of previous decision rules used in the EU Council of Ministers leads to the estimates reported in Sect. 1 of Birkmeier (2011) . They suggest that, in the past, the Union functioned with a mixture that puts a weight of 10 % on the diplomatic equality principle, and a complementary 90 % weight on the democratic equality principle. With these weightings, the optimal quota is found to be 60.98 %, see Birkmeier (2011, p. 117) . This is slightly below the quota of 61.6 % proposed in the Jagiellonian Compromise of Słomczyński andŻyczkowski (2010) .
The mixture criterion is roughly in line with the composition of the European Parliament where each Member State is guaranteed six seats out of a total of 751 seats. That is, 20 % of the seats are preassigned to the Member States obeying the diplomatic equality principle of one state, one vote. The remaining 80 % then might be allocated via a proportional representation apportionment method to honor the democratic equality principle of one person, one vote, as proposed in the Cambridge Compromise of Grimmett et al. (2011) .
